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Religious Freedom in Germany
Gerhard Robbers ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
At least from a U.S. perspective, religious freedom in Germany
has become a matter of concern in recent years.1 It may well be time
to reconsider the law and the facts of religious life in a country under
scrutiny due to its twentieth-century history. Upholding religious
freedom is a key issue in any community committed to the idea of
human rights. After the end of the devastating rule of nationalsocialism, Germany reestablished its long-standing cultural history in
which it had intensively contributed to the development of human
rights. The purpose of this article is to describe the various normative
sources of religious freedom in Germany and to establish an
understanding of religious freedom as a positive freedom in harmony
with the legitimate culture of the people concerned.
II. THE NORMATIVE SYSTEM
A. Constitutional Provisions
Religious freedom has a prominent place in Germany’s
constitution.2 Freedom of religion is protected before many other
∗ Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Trier, Germany. Professor Robbers is the
Director of the Institute for European Constitutional Law and a judge at the Administrative
Court of Appeals Rhineland-Palatine. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the
European Consortium for Church-State Research and is also a member of the OSCE Board of
Experts on Religious Freedom. He is the managing co-editor of Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts
and editor of STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1997).
1. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GERMANY (Sept.
5, 2000) (visited Mar. 15, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/ global/human_rights/irf/
irf_rpt/irf_germany.html> [hereinafter U.S. STATE DEP’T 2000 REPORT].
2. Religious freedom is guaranteed in Article 4 of the German Constitution, which
translates as follows:
I. Freedom of belief and of conscience and freedom of creed, religious or
ideological, are inviolable.
II. The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.
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freedoms. Only human dignity,3 freedom and life,4 and equal
protection5 are human rights placed before religious freedom in
Germany’s constitution. Religious freedom under the German
constitution means freedom of belief and freedom to act according
to one’s beliefs. The constitution secures religious freedom for both
individuals and collective bodies.
The various freedoms guaranteed for religious institutions in
Germany can be found in the German constitution, in the
constitutions of the German Länder and in ordinary laws, and in the
various treaties between the state and specific religions.6 In addition
to the central guarantee of religious freedom, the constitution offers
additional religious rights and institutional guarantees for churches
and religious communities. According to Article 3 of the
constitution, no one shall be prejudiced or favored because of his
faith or religion.7 This guarantee is specified for civil rights, public
office, and public service.8 Article 4 provides for the right to refrain
from military service in the name of religion.9 Article 7 guarantees
religious instruction in public schools and includes the right to
abstain from that instruction.10 Article 7 also secures the right to
establish and to run religiously or ideologically based private
schools.11
Several far-reaching institutional guarantees for churches and
other religious communities referred to in the German constitution12
have been incorporated from the German Reich’s Weimar
constitution of 1919 (“WRV”).13 The most important provisions are
III. No one may be compelled against his conscience into military service involving
armed combat. Details shall be regulated by federal law.
GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 4 (F.R.G.).
3. GG art. 1.
4. GG art. 2.
5. GG art. 3.
6. All sixteen Länder (i.e., states) of the Federal Republic of Germany have their own
constitutions, most of which contain guarantees of fundamental rights including religious
freedom.
7. GG art. 3(III).
8. GG art. 33(III). See also GG art. 140; WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG [Constitution of the Weimar Republic] [WRV] art. 136.
9. GG art. 4(III), 12a(II), (III).
10. GG art. 7(II), (III).
11. GG art. 7(IV), (V).
12. GG art. 140.
13. WRV arts. 136–39 & 141.
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as follows: there shall be no state church, i.e., no established
church;14 all religious communities shall enjoy the right to selfdetermination,15 the status of certain religious communities as public
corporations,16 equal rights to associations that foster a nonreligious, philosophical creed,17 the guarantee of Sundays and feastdays,18 and chaplainry in public institutions.19
The preamble to the German constitution also describes
Germany’s commitment to religious freedom. It states: “Conscious
of their responsibility before God and humankind, animated by the
resolve to serve world peace as an equal part of a united Europe, the
German people have adopted, by virtue of their constituent power,
this Basic Law.”20 The reference to God and humankind acknowledges responsibility for the crimes committed during nationalsocialism and responsibility to prevent a repetition of those events in
Germany. This reference to God does not allude to nor establish any
specific religious belief.21 Rather, by referring to God, the preamble
acknowledges a sphere of transcendence, indicating a borderline for
the state—that is, a field beyond the reach of the state. It suggests
that there is something other than the political order established by
the constitution, that the state is not all-powerful. The preamble is
anti-totalitarian.
B. Other Textual Sources of Religious Freedom
Religious freedom in Germany is rooted as well in texts other
than the constitution, such as the Länder constitutions, agreements
between the government and specific religious organizations, and
case law. The Länder are responsible for most competencies in
matters of religion, churches, and other religious communities.
Länder constitutions and ordinary laws govern the concrete shape of

14. WRV art. 137(I).
15. WRV art. 137(III).
16. WRV art. 137(V).
17. Weltanschaungsgemeinschaften [non-religious philosophical organizations]; WRV
art. 137(VII).
18. WRV art. 139.
19. WRV art. 141.
20. GG preamble.
21. See Christian Starck, Präambel, No. 36, in 1 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, KOMMENTAR [THE BONN CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARY] (Hans von Mangoldt et al. eds.,
1999).
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the regime of church-state relations and religious freedom in
Germany. They do so in a variety of ways, all rich in detail and
diversity.22 The basic, and sometimes controversial, features of this
system include the legal status of churches and other religious
communities, the church tax, religious instruction in public schools,
and the right to self-determination. Many details of the German
system of religious freedom are being laid down in agreements
between the state and a considerable number of religious
communities.23 Through these agreements, the specific needs of
various religious communities can be adequately accommodated. As
for the influence of case law, the jurisdiction of the courts regarding
church-state issues is vast.24 Despite a number of questionable
decisions, German courts and the administration are generally
favorably disposed toward religion and religious communities,
accepting them as an integral part of society.
III. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW ON RELIGION: FREEDOM,
STATE NEUTRALITY, AND EQUAL TREATMENT
The sources of the law on religion as discussed above may be
categorized into three basic ideas: freedom, state neutrality, and
equal treatment. These underlying ideas are undoubtedly interlinked.
Additional principles, such as tolerance, also figure into their
implementation. To state these basic ideas does not amount to
structuring a theory, but merely to identify some of the most
predominant leading categories.
Religious freedom is fully understood only as a positive freedom.
State neutrality is in harmony with the special status of religions, as
well as with religious instruction in public schools, and it requires far
reaching self-determination of religious institutions. Equal treatment
22. See AXEL FREIHERR VON CAMPENHAUSEN, STAATSKIRCHENRECHT: EIN STUDIEN[CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW: A HANDBOOK] (3d ed. 1996). See generally Heiner
Marré, Das kirchliche Besteuerungsrecht [Church Taxation Law], in 1 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY] 1101 (Joseph Listl & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed. 1994); BERND
JEAND’HEUR & STEFAN KORIOTH, GRUNDZÜGE DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS [PRINCIPLES
OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] (2000).
23. See DIE KONKORDATE UND KIRCHENVERTRÄGE IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [CONCORDATS AND CHURCH CONTRACTS IN GERMANY] (Joseph Listl ed., 1987).
24. For a more complete reference to recent German (and French) court decisions in
matters of religion, see the database at <http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr> (visited Feb. 15,
2001).
BUCH
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requires awareness of the specific needs of different religions. These
principles and their adequate interpretation rest in underlying
cultural convictions rooted in Germany’s cultural history.
A.

Religious Freedom

The primary idea of freedom means that all religious creeds are
tolerated and free to flourish. In addition to mere toleration, the
German political system supports the idea of positive freedom. While
government must not forbid certain beliefs nor discriminate against
them, it must also go further to create a positive atmosphere of
tolerance within society. In this context, one may mention the
problems there were some time ago with the Church of Scientology,
or, on quite a different level, shameful ongoing attacks on Jewish
institutions, even if not directly rooted in religious prejudice. The
legal framework embodied in the basic idea of positive religious
freedom must give ample room for the exercise of religious beliefs.
Pursuant to this idea of positive religious freedom, the Federal
Constitutional Court decided, for example, that the general
association law of Germany must be interpreted in a manner
compatible with the specific religious needs of the Bahá’í.25 The
general interpretation of the law on associations normally requires
each registered association to have a legally independent board of
governors. The Court held that the local associations of the Bahá’í,
because of religious liberty, are free to formally affiliate themselves
with one national board of governors.
In recognition of the importance of religious freedom,
Germany’s constitution mandates that laws that limit religious
freedom comply with special requirements. Other freedoms, like the
freedom of association or the free exercise of one’s profession, can be
limited by laws protecting any legitimate public interest and
complying with other constitutional standards like proportionality,
certainty, or the protection of reasonable trust. Religious freedom
cannot be limited by just any law purporting to protect the public
interest. It can only be limited by a law that enforces public interests
laid down in the Constitution itself.26 These limits should be
interpreted narrowly, thereby respecting the importance of religious
25. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court] [hereinafter BVerfGE] 83, 341.
26. BVerfGE 32, 98 (107).

647

12ROB-FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/25/01 9:43 PM

[2001

freedom. Thus, an optimal balance has to be found respecting both
religious freedom and other legitimate public interests.
The Federal Administrative Court has recently weighed religious
freedoms against public interests to decide whether students and
teachers may participate in religious traditions that may interfere with
public school regulations. In one instance, the Federal Administrative Court allowed a female Islamic student in public school to
opt out of otherwise compulsory coeducational sports classes, such as
coeducational swimming. Her religious belief prescribed certain
dressing rules for girls incompatible with the normal level of
coeducational sports involvement.27 In addition, Islamic pupils can
obtain leave from school for certain high Islamic religious holidays.28
Female Islamic pupils are also permitted to exercise their right to
religious freedom by wearing religious head scarves in school;
apparently this creates no legal problems nor public concern in
Germany. However, the issue of whether an Islamic public school
teacher can wear a religious scarf poses the question of whether or
not this interferes with the public schools’ obligation to maintain
religious neutrality. There are two cases pending before courts on
the matter. The Administrative Court in Stuttgart decided that the
duty of religious neutrality in school prevails over the religious rights
of the teacher.29 By contrast, the Administrative Court in Lüneburg
decided that the teacher’s right to religious freedom prevails.30 Both
cases are now pending before higher courts.
The decisive question in both of the above-mentioned cases is
probably not that of religious freedom. It is instead the ability of the
individual teacher to ensure neutrality of public school education and
not to indoctrinate children. If teachers are able to abstain from
indoctrinating the children, the teacher should be allowed to wear
her head scarf, as is known to be the practice in NorthrhineWestfalia.

27. Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts [Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court] [hereinafter BVerwGE] 94, 82.
28. See Answer of the Federal Government to the Question of the Fraction of
CDU/CSU, Bundestags-Drucksache [Federal Parliament-Printed Document] [hereinafter BTDrs.] 14/4530 (08.11.2000) [Nov. 8, 2000].
29. Verwaltungsgericht [Administrative Court] [hereinafter VG] Stuttgart, NVwZ
[NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR VERWALTUNGSRECHT/NEW J. FOR ADMIN. L.] 959 (2000).
30. VG Lüneburg, NJW [NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT/NEW LEGAL WKLY.]
707 (2001).
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B. Neutrality

The second category of Germany’s law on religion is neutrality.
Neutrality embraces the principles of non-identification and nonintervention. From the principle of non-identification it follows that
there is no established church in Germany.31 Religious communities
are either organized as private associations or as corporations under
public law. There is no special register for religious communities in
Germany. A manifestation of non-intervention is that the government guarantees far reaching self-determination of religious communities.
1. Public law status
Germany retains neutrality in part by not maintaining an
established state church. The basic elements for legally organizing a
church are outlined in Article 140 of the Constitution. It provides
that religious societies shall remain corporations under public law
insofar as they have enjoyed that status in the past.32 Other religious
societies shall be granted the same rights upon application if their
constitution and the number of their members give assurance of
their permanency.
Granting churches and other religious communities legal status
as corporations under public law does not incorporate them into the
state hierarchy.33 On the contrary, it is a status sui generis (“in a class
of its own”). Each religious community that gives some assurance of
its permanency and its loyalty to the law34 can obtain this status as a
public corporation. In fact, many various religious communities are
organized as public law corporations in the various Länder. The two
largest churches in Germany, the Catholic and the Protestant
Church, each of which comprises about twenty-seven million
members,35 are both public law corporations. So are Jewish cult
31. WRV art. 137(I); GG art. 140.
32. WRV art. 137(V); GG art. 140.
33. BVerfGE 18, 385 (386); BVerfGE 30, 415 (428); BVerfGE 42, 312 (332);
BVerfGE 66, 1 (19).
34. See WRV art. 137(V); GG art. 140.
35. As of 1997, the population of Germany was estimated at 82 million. Of this, there
are approximately 27.4 million Catholics, 27.4 million Protestants, 3 million Muslims, 1
million Orthodox, 150,000 Jews, 140,000 Buddhists, 66,000 Hindus, 5000 Bahái’í, 2 million
members of numerous smaller religious communities, and 21 million of no religious
membership. The data for some religious communities is rather uncertain; in recent years there
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communities, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Baptist Church, the ChristCatholics, the New Apostolic Church, the Anglican Church, a
number of Orthodox Churches, Pentecostal Communities, Christian
Science, the Mennonites, the Methodist Church, and the Salvation
Army. A number of philosophical, non-religious communities such
as the Alliance for Spiritual Freedom or the Humanist Community
are also public law corporations.36
Whether Jehovah’s Witnesses should obtain the status of public
corporation is now pending again before the Federal Administrative
Court. In its first decision, the Court, contrary to the lower courts,
decided that a religious or philosophical community must be “loyal
to the State” to achieve the status of a public law corporation.37 This
element was somewhat of a surprise addition to the requirements
generally recognized by law and jurisprudence to achieve this status.
Moreover, the Court held that Jehovah’s Witnesses did not meet this
requirement because Jehovah’s Witnesses, as a compelling precept of
faith, denied the active and passive right of their members to vote in
democratic state elections. Although there is no individual legal duty
in Germany to vote, the denial of participation in public elections
would undermine part of the basic principles of democratic order.
The Federal Constitutional Court vacated the judgment and
remanded the case to the Federal Administrative Court.38 The
Federal Constitutional Court held that loyalty to the state is not
requisite to obtaining public law status for a religious community. A
religious community applying to become a corporation under public
law must, however, be loyal to the law. It must guarantee that it will
observe the law and that it will exercise its rights in accordance with
the constitution and other laws. Furthermore, it must guarantee that
its future conduct will not endanger the fundamental principles of

has been strong Jewish immigration from eastern countries. See STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [STATISTICAL YEARBOOK FOR GERMANY] 95
(2000); Deutschland, in 2 RELIGION IN GESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART [RELIGION IN
HISTORY AND CURRENT TIMES] 751 (4th ed. 1999).
36. For an updated list of churches and religious communities, as well as philosophical
bodies with public law status, see the website of the Institute for European Constitutional Law
at the University of Trier: <http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr> (visited Feb. 15, 2001).
37. BVerwGE 105, 117.
38. BVerfG 19.12.2000 – 2 BvR 1500/97. See <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/frames/rs20001219_2bvr150097>.
FÜR DIE
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the constitution contained in Article 79.39 These include human
dignity, the core principles of human rights, the rule of law, and state
democracy. The religious organization must not endanger the
fundamental rights of third persons. Finally, it must not infringe
upon the fundamental principles of law concerning religion, based
on the idea of freedom and established by the constitution. The law
does not require any loyalty to the state extending further than that.
Whether Jehovah’s Witnesses will obtain status as a public law
corporation is still uncertain. The Federal Administrative Court must
now determine whether this religious community would persistently
act contrary to the law. For example, if Jehovah’s Witnesses
endanger the well-being of children by their rules on education or if
they coerce disaffected members into staying in the community,
these practices would be considered contrary to law.
There are some specific rights attached to the status of religious
or philosophical public law corporations. They have the right to
employ civil servants and to create public law things (res sacrae,
etc.).40 The most obvious example of the rights attached to the
public law status is a church’s right to tax its members. This tax
functions like a membership fee. Those churches that do tax their
members usually levy a tax of eight or nine percent of what the
member pays in state income taxes. Some of the taxing churches use
the state’s taxation system, i.e., the state machinery collects the
church tax. For this service, a churches pays four to five percent of its
tax revenue to the state. Indeed, the church tax system was
introduced to de-establish former state churches in the nineteenth
century and to force them to depend on their own income.41 The
institution of church taxes is thus a consequence of state neutrality.

39. GG art. 79(III).
40. “Public law things” (öffentliche Sachen) is a special institution of German law
meaning the dedication of means such as streets, places, furniture, books, or the like to public
use, irrespective of civil law ownership. The dedication creates a special status of these things
protecting the public use. For a discussion of the relationship between public law things and
churches, see Dieter Schütz, Res sacrae, in 2 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS
[HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW] 3 (Joseph Listl & Dietrich Pirson eds., 2d ed.
1995).
41. See Marré, supra note 22, at 1101.
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2. Religious instruction in public schools
The idea of religious instruction42 in public schools in Germany
also follows from state neutrality. Religious instruction in public
schools is offered as an ordinary subject by the state. Its content,
however, is determined by the relevant religious communities,
irrespective of their status as private or public law corporations. Thus
Catholic religious instruction is provided for Catholic pupils,
Protestant instruction for Protestants, Jewish instruction for Jews,
and Islamic instruction for Muslims.43 As soon as a minimum
number of pupils aggregate in a public school,44 the school must
provide religious instruction funded by the state. There is no
obligation to attend, for the pupils can opt out, and no teacher is
obliged to teach contrary to his or her own religious convictions.
The reasoning behind this system follows from the idea of state
neutrality. Because the state makes schooling compulsory, the
government takes much of the pupils’ time and energy. Indeed, the
government takes over the responsibility for the children’s education
in all aspects. As such, at least from the view of positive religious
freedom, the state must also accommodate religious needs.
Many say45 this system of providing religious instruction in public
schools is a direct consequence of the idea of separation of church
and state. Public education is based on the idea that the state has
some responsibility to educate the upcoming generation. This
responsibility stands alongside the right of the parents to raise their
children according to their own convictions. An important purpose
for religious education in public schools is the objective of
integrating the population, of unifying the pluralistic and sometimes
antagonistic society.
Education is a process of developing the whole personality of a

42. See generally Gerhard Robbers, Art. 7, in 1 DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, KOM[THE BONN CONSTITUTION, COMMENTARY], supra note 21; Christoph Link,
Religionsunterricht, in 2 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY], supra note 22, at
439.
43. Regarding Islamic religious instruction, see BVerwG, DVBl. [DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT/GERMAN ADMIN J.] 1001 (2000); Martin Heckel, Religionsunterricht für
Muslime? [Religious Instruction for Muslims?], JZ [JURISTENZEITUNG/JURIST’S J.] 74 (1999);
see also infra Part III.C.2–3.
44. Anywhere from five to twelve pupils can constitute a sufficient minimum.
45. For references, see generally Link, supra note 42, at 503.
MENTAR
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young human being. The purpose of education is not only to convey
certain specific knowledge of facts and specific technical abilities, but
to integrate a personality into a culture. This holistic understanding
of education also encompasses religion. To form a personality also
means to open the field of religious convictions and ideas to an
individual. The religious side of a personality cannot be formed by
merely confronting a youth with different ideas, leaving the decision
completely to that person in a later age. Forming a personality within
a religious life means to convey and accept a set of truths and deeplyrooted convictions. Embracing religion means to rely on certain
truths.
The necessity of teaching religion through religious convictions
may be compared to teaching a language. A child in Spain does not
learn how to speak by comparing all the different major languages in
the world in order to one day be able to choose between all of them
whichever one may best fit his or her convictions. Children in Spain
are simply taught Spanish. Any other method would inhibit children
from being able to speak at all. After the initial language is mastered,
additional languages can be learned and explored.
Teaching a child within one specific religion, however, poses a
dilemma for the neutral state. The neutral state cannot implement
religious truth, but has to be open to different religious ideas.
Bearing the responsibility—along with parents—of forming the
personality of the young person, the state has a duty to cultivate the
religious side of the personality. Rejecting religion completely by
pushing it aside to the evening hours or to Sundays, or in other ways
ignoring the thirst for truth, would discriminate against religion.
This again would lead to a compromise of state neutrality. Moreover,
rejecting religion would mean to fail in the task of forming the whole
personality of the child and of integrating important aspects of
society.
To achieve these goals, the state facilitates religious instruction in
public schools, but allows the relevant religious communities to
define its content. The religious organizations decide on the spiritual
curriculum; they decide on truth. The state is obliged only to make
religious instruction adequately available and to guarantee that no
one is forced to take these courses. If it is truly voluntary, this
cooperationist approach neatly separates church and state.
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3. Religious communities and self-determination
a. Principles of religious self-determination. Governmental
neutrality also means nonintervention in the internal affairs of
religious communities. All religious communities, regardless of their
organizational status, enjoy very broad self-determination or
autonomy. All enjoy a number of exemptions or special
considerations with regard to labor laws, data protection laws, etc.
The legal treatment of religious communities is somewhat similar to
the treatment of tendency corporations, whose employees can be
legally dismissed by the employer if they publicly contradict the
opinions their employer represents. For example, a medical doctor
was legally dismissed by a Catholic hospital in Germany when he
advocated far-reaching abortion rights in a national newspaper and
on television, while identifying his position in the Catholic hospital.46
The religiously based employer is quite free to define the loyalty
obligations of its employees in order to protect the employer’s public
image. This latitude must be balanced against the employee’s
freedom of expression.
b. Limits to religious self-determination. Limitations to church
self-determination are only those prescribed by a “law that applies to
all.”47 There is some debate about the correct meaning of that
limitation phrase. The Federal Constitutional Court has offered
different explanations.
The first attempt to elaborate the limitation clause amounts to a
theory of spheres.48 The Court recognizes an inner sphere of church
affairs insulated from matters of the state or secular society. The
inner sphere would, for example, embrace the doctrines of the
church. No state law may limit autonomy within this inner sphere.
Outside this core, an outer sphere of church affairs embraces its

46. BVerfGE 70, 138; European Commission for Human Rights 06.09.1989 [Sept. 6,
1989] BNr. 12242/86; Rommelfanger.
47. WRV art. 137(III); GG art. 140; Konrad Hesse, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der
Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften [The Right to Self-Determination of Churches and Religious Communities], in 1 HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDES-REPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY], supra note 22, at
521; Alexander Hollerbach, Der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz kirchlicher Organisation [The Constitutional Protection of Church Organization], in 6 HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS
[HANDBOOK OF STATE LAW] 557 (Joseph Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1989).
48. BVerfGE 18, 385 (387); BVerfGE 42, 312 (334); BVerfGE 66, 1 (20); BVerfGE
72, 278 (289).
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interaction with public matters. Business activities, such as banking
or insurance, fall into this sphere. State laws can limit church
activities in this outer sphere in the same way as for any other
purpose.
Charmingly simple at first glance, this theory has provoked
intense criticism. It is very difficult—probably impossible—to clearly
distinguish these two spheres. Filling offices in the church would
generally be regarded as a core question for the church. The
question of women priests, imams, or rabbis, for example, raises
important theological problems. Removing someone from church
office—such as a Catholic priest who converts to Protestantism—
seems to be a matter of the inner sphere, but it would also clearly
implicate state interests in protecting individuals from undue
dismissal.
The second attempt to elaborate the limitation clause is the socalled “everyone clause.” It states that only those limitations on
church autonomy are valid that affect churches or other religious
communities in no other way than anyone else.49 Yet there are
numerous laws that only affect the religious organizations or affect
them specifically, and the constitutionality of these laws is
undisputed. These laws concern, for example, church taxation,
church subsidies, or religious instruction in public schools. Many
laws impact churches differently than they impact other
organizations. For instance, regulations on public noise affect church
bell-ringing or imam prayer call.
The third approach is the balancing theory—the prevailing “test”
today. It approves of general laws that limit church autonomy only if
they are necessary to guarantee the “compelling requirements” of
peaceful coexistence in a society that is religiously neutral and
respects the freedom of religious communities. Competing interests
of church and state must be carefully balanced, leading, if possible,
to an optimum for both.50

49. BVerfGE 42, 312 (334).
50. BVerfGE 53, 366 (401); BVerfGE 66, 1 (22); BVerfGE 70, 138 (167); BVerfGE
72, 278 (289).
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Equal Treatment

1. The theory of equal treatment
The third category of Germany’s law on religion is equal
treatment. The rights of religious organizations do not depend on
the state’s opinion of their creed. Indeed, the state is forbidden from
judging the spiritual truth of any creed. All religions have similar
rights, whether the organization is large or small, traditional or
newly founded.51 There can be, however, certain variations according
to the social importance of a group. Religious instruction in public
schools requires a certain number of pupils of the same religious
community.52 State collection of church taxes requires a certain
number of members—25,000 in Bavaria or 40,000 in NorthrhineWestfalia.53 In qualifying as a corporation under public law, the size
of membership can indicate the organization’s prospects for
permanency.54
This is quite in line with the principle of equal protection. Taken
seriously, the idea of equal rights makes possible a system of
adequate attribution of positions. Equality does not mean identity,
but adequacy, i.e., appropriate rights and positions. From the
perspective of equality differences are possible as long as they are
legitimate. Differences have to be based on legitimate reasons.
2. Putting theory into practice: Islamic immigration and integration
into Germany
Probably the foremost challenge in German law on religion
today is the need to integrate the large Islamic population. About
three million Muslims live in Germany today. The most recent
official statement about Muslims in Germany is found in an Answer
of the Federal Government to the Parliamentary Question of the

51. Gerhard Robbers, Minority Churches in Germany, in THE LEGAL STATUS OF
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 153 (European
Consortium for Church-State Research ed., 1994); Josef Jurina, Die Religionsgemeinschaften
mit privatrechtlichem Rechtsstatus [Religious Communities with Private-law Status], in 1
HANDBUCH DES STAATSKIRCHENRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [HANDBOOK OF CIVIL ECCLESIASTICAL LAW IN GERMANY], supra note 22, at 689.
52. See Robbers, supra note 42, at No. 144 .
53. See VON CAMPENHAUSEN, supra note 22, at 267.
54. WRV art. 137(V); GG art. 140.
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Fraction of the CDU/CSU.55 The experience of integrating Islam
on a large scale is new. The overwhelming majority of Muslims,
primarily from Turkey, have immigrated into the country seeking
work within the last four decades. Originally, immigrants were
expected to return to their home country after finishing their work,
but now many have decided to stay in Germany. In response,
Germany’s law on religion will have to show its ability to integrate or
will risk losing legitimacy. Christians and Muslims have longestablished and deeply rooted sets of values. In meeting, both must
be open to adaptation to assure peaceful coexistence. Many cultural
habits can result in social tensions. It is remarkable how few incidents
of that kind have occurred. So far, xenophobia has not crystallized
on religious questions.
German law, like all European and North American law, is
deeply influenced by Judeo-Christian ideas. To date, for the law, the
most difficult aspect of handling Islam is its different cultural
attitudes toward representation. Many public institutions must
interact with someone who represents the community of believers in
order to provide religious freedom. A representative is needed to
form a public corporation, to establish the content of religious
instruction in public schools, or to apply for an exception to animal
protection laws that prohibit ritual slaughter.56 Considerable progress
has been made as Muslims have organized themselves in Islamic
associations and have achieved representation before government
offices. However, there remains considerable fluctuation in terms of
institutions and personnel.
3. Islamic religious instruction in public schools
Following a decision of the Federal Administrative Court, Islamic
religious instruction as a distinct subject can now be offered in public
schools in Berlin.57 This development will influence the situation in
the other Länder; about 700,000 Islamic pupils attend German
schools.
In general, though, Islamic religious instruction is still taught
differently from normal religious instruction in many public schools
55. BT-Drs., supra note 28, 14/4530 (08.11.2000) [Nov. 8, 2000].
56. BVerwGE 99, 1; BVerwG (23.11.2000) [Nov. 23, 2000] – 3 C 40.99.
57. BVerwG DVBl. [DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT/GERMAN ADMIN. J.] 1001
(2000).
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and thus deviates from the constitutional requirements. Since the
need for Islamic religious instruction in public schools has become
urgent in the last three decades, no representatives of Islam (who
could determine the Islamic curriculum) have been accepted by the
relevant Islamic population as legitimate. Meanwhile, in order to
provide some Islamic instruction, it is taught as an integral part of
the classes in Islamic culture and language that are offered in many
public schools to enable Muslims, especially Turks, to remain rooted
in their mother tongue and culture. Similar instruction is offered in
Farsi and Arabic. In doing so, some Länder are cooperating with
certain local Islamic associations in Germany to establish the relevant
curricula, and others are cooperating with the Turkish consulates.
Yet, this means that state authorities decide on curricula on religion
contrary to the constitution, though at present it is as near to the
constitutional requirements as possible. For the future one can hope
that a number of Islam associations may prove representative enough
to establish Islam curricula in order to introduce confessional Islamic
religion instruction on a larger scale in complete conformity with the
constitutional requirements.
D. Background Convictions of Religious Freedom in Germany
Three cultural convictions stand behind the current German
system: the necessity of institutions for religious life, freedom of
religion as a positive freedom, and the idea that religion is a positive
factor in public life. These explain the current legal system in
Germany regarding freedom of religion.
First, religious freedom, though highly personal and individual,
cannot do without institutions. Religion as a matter of social fact is a
matter of community, exercised in community with others.
Institutions are the framework, the basis, and the structure in which
individual belief prospers. No legal order disregarding the
institutional aspect of religious freedom can fully guarantee this
human right.
Second, religious freedom is adequately guaranteed as a positive
freedom. The law must actively accommodate the religious
convictions of the people. If government supports culture by
providing theatres for the fine arts and supports fitness by providing
stadiums and swimming pools, then the government must not
discriminate against human religious needs just because they are
religious.
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Third, religion and philosophical creeds are regarded as a positive
factor in public life. They have not only private but public standing,
without being part of the state. German legal culture recognizes a
public sphere, which is distinct from governmental or private
spheres.
IV. READY LAW AND REAL LIFE: CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
Like a number of other European states and organizations,
Germany has conducted a parliamentary report on smaller and new
religious communities.58 This report became an object of particular
concern especially in the United States. Parliamentary reports were
published in France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden,
Germany, the European Union, and the Council of Europe.59 The
German parliamentary report, compared to most of the other

58. BT-Drs. 13/10950, Neue religiöse und ideologische Gemeinschaften und
Psychogruppen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland—Endbericht der Enquête-Kommission
“Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen” [New Religious and Ideological Communities and
Psychological Groups in Germany—Final Report of the Enquête-Commission “So-Called
Sects and Psychological Groups”] vom 9.6.1998 [from June 9, 1998].
59. France: Rapport no. 2468 de M. Jacques Guyard, fait au nom de la commission
d’enquête sur les sects, President M. Alain Gest, 22.12.1995 [(Parliamentary) Report No.
2468 from Mr. Jacques Guyard, done in the name of the enquiry commission about the sects,
President Mr. Alain Gest, Dec. 22, 1995]; Belgium: Rapport fait au nom de la commission
d’enquête par Mm. Duquesne et Willems, Rapport de la Commission Parlamentaire belge
d’enquête sur les Sectes [Report done in the name of the enquiry commission by Mr.
Duquesne and Mr. Willems, Report of the Belgian parliamentary commission of enquiry into
sects] 313/7 – 95/96; Spain: Sectas en España [Sects in Spain], Juan Manuel del Pozo Alvarez, III Legislatura [III legislation], Madrid 1989; Netherlands: Onderzock betreffende
Sekten, Overheid en nieuwe religieuze bewegingen, Tobias A. M. Witteveen, Tweede Kamer
der Staaten – Generaal, Vergaderjaar [Enquiry concerning sects, office of new religious
movements, Tobias A. M. Witteveen, Second Chamber of the States-General, session year]
1983–1984, Drucksache [Printed document] 16635, 1984; Italy: Sette religiose e nuovi
movimenti magici in Italia, Ministero dell’ Interno, Dipartimento della Publica Sicurezza,
Roma [Religious sects and new magic movements in Italy, Ministry of the Interior,
Department of Public Security, Rome] 1998; Sweden: In Good Faith, Society and the new
religious movements, Summary. SOU 1998: 113, at <http://www.social.regeringen.se/
propositionerum/sou/pdf/sou98_113eng.pdf> (visited Mar. 15, 2001). European Union; EP
EG No. C 078 of 18.3.1996, at 0031; Council of Europe: AS Jur (1998) 38 – 15.5.1998 –
06–17, ajdoc 38.98. In the United Kingdom, there were government-initiated enquiries: Sir
John Foster, Enquiring into the Practice and Effects of Scientology HMSO, 1971; Eileen
Barker, New Religious Movements: A Practical Introduction, HMSO, 1989; see also Australia:
Report of the Board of Enquiry into Scientology, Anderson, K. V., Q. C., State of Victoria,
Australia 1965; New Zealand: Hubbard Scientology Organisation in New Zealand and any
Associated Scientology Organizations or Bodies in New Zealand, Report of the Commission of
Inquiry, Wellington 1969.
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parliamentary reports, probably draws the least far reaching
conclusions. It found that existing law was, on the whole, adequate
to handle any specific dangers posed by those communities. Probably
the most far reaching suggestion was to consider introducing
criminal liability for legal persons. So far, the concept of criminal
liability for legal persons is alien to German law. Introducing it
would have implications by no means focused on religious
communities. The report states explicitly that problems and dangers
for individual believers (that might result from conflicts in their
individual and social sphere) must be balanced against the individual
and social benefit that people can experience in these religious
groups. The report thus suggests interdisciplinary and independent
research in the field of religious, ideological, and psychological
phenomena.60
Certainly one can doubt the necessity and perhaps the legitimacy
of parliamentary reports on religious communities. The dangers are
obvious. Governments could be tempted to make statements about
the truth of the different doctrines contrary to state neutrality.
Religious communities could feel attacked and intimidated by being
publicly monitored. The fact of certain religious communities being
the object of parliamentary scrutiny might deter individuals from
joining such communities.
The preliminary, interim report61 was by no means appropriate to
ease such concerns. The final report, though, managed in general to
avoided undue statements. The report, in order to avoid
stigmatization, did not contain a list of relevant communities.
The report would justify its monitoring of religious communities
by the very duty of government to prevent public danger. The
Federal Constitutional Court has upheld the government’s right to
warn against dangers of religious communities.62 Reports of
collective suicides or mass murder,63 and of child misuse in some
60. BT-Drs., supra note 57, 13/10950, 6.1/6.2.
61. BT-Drs. 13/8170.
62. BVerfG NJW [NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT/NEW LEGAL WKLY.] 3269
(1989).
63. For example, the activities of Aum-Shinrikyô in Japan created widespread concern.
Cf. R.J. Kisala, Reactions to Aum: The Revision of the Religious Corporation Law, in 22
JAPANESE RELIGIONS 60–74 (1997); Charles Schwarzenegger, Über das Verhältnis von
Religion, Sekten und Kriminalität, Eine Analyse der kriminologischen und strafrechtlichen
Aspekte am Beispiel der japanischen Aum-Shinrikyô-Sekte [On the Relationship between Religion,
Sects, and Crime, An Analysis of the Criminological and Criminal Law Aspects Based on the
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religious communities had created widespread concern.64 The
German parliamentary report in fact did focus somewhat on the
psychological status of children in the relevant religious communities.
Many questions had arisen in German society as to whether
certain smaller, new, unknown religious communities complied with
the very basic requirements of a democratic and peaceful community
under the rule of law. Reports, mostly from former members,
alleging totalitarian and exploitative practices by religious communities had gained public attention.65 German society, because of
its experience with totalitarian, national-socialist rule, is very sensitive
to the threat of any further totalitarianism. Nazi rule rapidly spread
from a very small group with an intense ideology and belief to grasp
hold of the whole country. A fundamental concern in German
society is to ensure against that ever happening again. Being rightly
attentive to this issue, however, may occasionally lead the government to be somewhat oversensitive.
In the end, the conclusions of the final parliamentary report
almost completely assuaged public concern. The question was off the
political agenda virtually overnight. Ultimately, the parliamentary
report contributed intensively to religious tolerance in Germany.
It may well be regarded as having been unwise of the report to
somewhat single out the Church of Scientology. This report,
however, must be considered in its contemporary context. At that
time, intense public debate and probably undue excitement raged on
all sides. In the time before the report was published, the Church of
Scientology had distributed a pamphlet indicating its situation in
Germany to be alike the persecution of the Jews under nationalsocialism.66 This reproach was felt to be a gross and outrageous

Japanese Aum-Shinrikyô Sect], in SEKTEN UND OKKULTISMUS,
ASPEKTE, REIHE KRIMINOLOGIE [SECTS AND OCCULTISM,
CRIMINOLOGICAL ASPECTS, CRIMINOLOGICAL SERIES] 14 (Pierre-Henri Bolle et al. eds.,
1996).
64. ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT KINDERUND JUGENDSCHUTZ HAMBURG E.V.: SATANISMUS UND RITUELLER MIßBRAUCH, AKTUELLE ENTWICKLUNGEN UND KONSEQUENZEN
FÜR DIE JUGENDHILFE [COMMITTEE FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT PROTECTION IN HAMBURG: SATANISM AND RITUAL ABUSE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT AND CONSEQUENCES FOR
THE PROTECTION OF YOUTH] (1996).
65. See ENTKOMMEN [ESCAPED] (1993).
66. HASS UND PROPAGANDA [HATE AND PROPAGANDA] (Church of Scientology
International ed., 1993).
Example

of

the

KRIMINOLOGISCHE
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misuse of the deep suffering of millions; the Special Rapporteur for
Religious Freedom of the United Nations, Abdelfatthah Amor
rejected the comparison as childish.67 It was felt that the number of
debatable decisions regarding the Church of Scientology and the
reaction of the free press in Germany could not possibly compare in
any reasonable way with the mass-murder and persecution
committed under national-socialism. In its latest official statement
about the Church of Scientology, which is under observation from
the Constitution Protection Office (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz), the federal government declared it had no information about
criminal activity by the Church of Scientology or its members in
Germany or about the Church’s influence on the economy.68
It is estimated that the Church of Scientology has about 8000
adherents in Germany.69 The whole matter indeed raises central
questions about the structures necessary for religious freedom to
flourish in Germany. Obviously it is not a uniquely German problem.
The Church of Scientology in Germany has not heretofore generally
been accepted as a religious community.70 Since, in general, there is
no registration process for religions in Germany, the question of the
Church of Scientology’s status depends on the courts’ determination
of cases involving religious matters. A number of court decisions
concerning rather different cases71 relate to whether Scientology is a
religion at all. Seemingly, lower courts have been more open to
accept Scientology as a religion than have the higher courts.
In 1984, a member of the Church of Scientology struggled to
gain acknowledgment as a priest of that community. The status of
priest would free him from compulsory military service, an
exemption that applies to priests of all religious communities. The

67. Implementation of the Declaration of the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. Report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah
Amor, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution
1996/23, Addendum, Visit to Germany: Commission on Human Rights 54th session
E/CN.4/1998/6/Add.2.
68. BT-Drs. 14/4541 [Answer of the Federal Government to a Question of the
Fraction of the CDU/CSU].
69. See U.S. STATE DEP’T 2000 REPORT, supra note 1.
70. Gregor Thüsing, Ist Scientology eine Religionsgemeinschaft? [Is Scientology a Religious
Organization?], 45 ZevKR [ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EVANGELISCHES KIRCHENRECHT/J. FOR
PROTESTANT ECCLESIASTICAL L.] 592 (2000).
71. A list of court rulings concerning the Church of Scientology can be found at
<http://www.uni-trier.de/~ievr> (visited April 30, 2001).
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administrative court found him to be a priest. However, the Federal
Administrative Court finally rejected his claim on the basis that the
Church of Scientology was not a religious community.72 Most cases
about the Church of Scientology’s status relate to economics, i.e.,
whether Scientology is a religion or a business.
It is because of the comfortable, somewhat privileged situation of
religion and religious communities in German law that some sort of
definition is required as to what a religion would be in terms of the
law. In a way, German law is at a loss to define religion as a legal
term. The superior courts up to now mainly have decided the
following way: Religion as well as ideological creed (Weltanschaung)
is a certainty about specific statements about the whole of the world
as well as about the source and the aim of the life of the human
beings. Religion is based on a reality that is transcendent to the
human being, whereas ideological creeds take to immanent
explanations. An association is a religious or ideological association
in the sense of the Basic Law, when its members or followers confess
on the basis of a common religious or ideological conviction
corresponding ideas about the meaning and the accomplishment of
human life.73 The Federal Constitutional Court, reluctant to give a
definition of religion within the last years, has held the following
about the range of the freedom of religion clause: in order to define
what a religion is, the self-perception of the relevant believer is of
major importance for the Court’s decision. In a system in which legal
consequences are attributed to the status of religion, though, the
law, and thus the courts and the state, must have the final decision.74
V.

APPROACHES TO SECURING FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Today, there seem to be two ways to secure human rights: a
monitoring approach and a structural approach. The monitoring
approach surveys various countries to detect any breach of human
rights. Findings are reported to publicly expose misconduct. It can
be effective in individual cases, and, if consequently performed, it
might well contribute to general keeping in line. This approach

72. BVerwG NJW 393 (1985).
73. BVerwGE 89, 368/370; BVerwGE 90, 112/115 f.; BAG JZ 1995, 951/952.
74. BVerfGE 83, 341; cf. Gerhard Robbers, Staat und Religion [State and Religion] in
59 VVDStRL [VERÖFFENTLICHUNGEN DER VEREINIGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER/PUBLICATIONS OF ASS’N OF GERMAN ST. L. TCHRS.] 231 (2000).
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resembles the approach of a court or prosecutor. It attempts to effect
positive change quickly, and it is a short term perspective.
Alternatively, the structural approach essays to integrate the
human rights perspective into the legal and social structures of a
culture. This more cooperative approach attempts to work from
where the people concerned are. This opens a more long-term
perspective, trying to get to the roots. It seeks not to threaten, but
to convince. Like other freedoms, religious freedom cannot be
adequately described in isolation. This thread weaves into a fabric of
freedoms and interests. Freedom of internal belief is undisputed and
unproblematic. Freedom to act according to one’s belief leads to
friction. This scope of freedom is limited by other persons’ freedoms,
the interests of community and state, and cultural circumstances.
The difficulty in balancing competing interests within one’s own
cultural tradition multiplies when one looks at foreign cultures.
Values change, different historical, social, and cultural requirements
evolve. Restrictions that seem incidental or even illegitimate in one
setting may be substantial and legitimate elsewhere.
A. The European Approach to Religious Freedom
There seems to be a deep difference in some contemporary
American approaches to religious freedom and the prevailing
German and European approaches. This difference does have some
intense consequences, not so much in Germany and Western
Europe, but in Eastern Europe.
The prevailing European approach tends to ask whether or not
religious groups can adequately live their religion. The inquiry
encompasses aspects such as social life, holidays and celebrations,
education, and military chaplainry. In Europe, the governments assist
in these aspects where necessary and permissible. Funding for
cultural and social activities of religious communities is possible as
well. In this approach, missionary work belongs to religion as one
part of the entire structure. It is a broad meaning of religious
freedom.
B. The Marketplace Model
The other approach experienced in Europe as a predominantly
American one is somewhat different. It could be called a marketplace
approach of religious freedom. The main question seems to be how
664
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to convince as many people as possible of one’s own truths. It is a
basically proselytizing idea of religious freedom, drawn from the idea
of competition. It is clear that the latter approach can be viewed as a
threat by the old, well situated, socially predominant religions. This
is especially the case when the new proselytizing religion can spend a
lot of money, when it can promise not only truth and tradition, but
economic forthcoming, better standard of living, and world travel.
That idea of a free marketplace itself is at stake, and with it the idea
of fair competition, if from the very beginning some of the
competitors have all the money, all the economic resources, and the
other competitors have none. Needless to say, this not only threatens
the traditional religions, but is also an economic and cultural factor
of opening markets.
In the marketplace view of religious freedom, the principle of
equal treatment is paramount. Any differences in treatment of
religious groups, any special registering of religious groups, any
different calibration according to size or social influence, any
reasoning drawn from the historical dominance of certain religious
denominations are immediately suspect. Any such distinctions are
decried, not merely as matters of religious discrimination, but as
assaults on religious freedom itself.
C. Religious Liberty as a Positive Freedom
The situation becomes more complicated when religious
freedom is understood as a positive freedom. This means that
religion is actively given room by public authorities to flourish. As
soon as religion is actively given a public role it is necessary to
distinguish and to ask for criteria of distribution of means.
For example, when church representatives sit on boards of youth
protection or public broadcasting stations, when they act as advisors
in parliament’s lawmaking process, when they shape religious
education in public schools, or when they serve as military chaplains,
they cannot do so in precise demographic proportions. How is exact
numerical representation possible when certain religious groups
consist of a handful of individuals—sincere and religious though they
may be? Enlarging the system of public representation to absolute
inclusion would bloat institutions to an enormous and unworkable
size.
Smaller, newer religious groups will tend to view a system not
based on the idea of identical rights as discriminatory, and thus
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contrary to religious freedom. The alternative is to sever religion
from the public institutions. This would certainly stunt positive
religious freedom. Moreover, it would undermine the concept of
democratic statehood: the will of the people determines the shape
and content of the legal system. If religious orientation were stripped
from the “will of the people,” this will would cease to represent its
constituents.
D. Germany’s Experience
In Germany, representatives of the Catholic, Protestant, and
Jewish constituencies, together with certain civic groups, hold seats
on advisory boards and committees that relate to pluralistic
representation and ethical issues. For example, boards on youth
protection censor or classify pornographic literature; other boards
govern public broadcasting institutions. Their purpose is to interpose
a layer of public, yet not governmental, institutions between the
private individual and the state. Today, up to 150,000 Jewish
individuals live in Germany, a comparatively small number due to the
Nazi murder of the Jewish people. The Jewish faith communities
thus are not as much represented in terms of number, but rather in
terms of culture and history. To offer them participation is a moral
duty in Germany today—it is a thought unthinkable to first kill
millions and then deprive the survivors of their share in representation, arguing they would be too few. These are different aspects
of equality in Germany than those that exist in other countries in
Europe and the world.
To safeguard religious liberty, the correct paradigm is equal
rights, not identical rights. The paradigm of identical rights cannot
appreciate the societal function of a religion, its historical impact, or
its cultural background. Identical rights would preclude a multitude
of manifestations of positive religious freedom. For instance, if an
identical right to sit on youth protection boards was granted to each
and every religious denomination, any utility of these boards would
be crushed by their enormity. The only other way to achieve all
inclusive representation would require trampling another religious
right to achieve proportional representation. It would require
compelling all religious denominations to organize a national board
to nominate common delegates. This outcome—identical, allinclusive representation by government decree—would establish a
civil religion.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Religious freedom is safeguarded by a large number of provisions
in German law that protect individual as well as collective and
corporate freedom. The German idea of religious freedom views this
right as a positive freedom, and the government is obliged to give
adequate room to actively live one’s religion. The system thus
established is structured by religious freedom, state neutrality, and
equal treatment of religions. It guarantees far reaching selfdetermination of religious associations. The special status of some
religious communities as corporations under public law, and the
ability to engage in religious instruction in public schools are in full
accordance with these requirements. The most important challenge
for Germany’s law on religion is the need to integrate large numbers
of Islamic immigrants into the system. Gratefully, many positive
steps have been taken to achieve this goal. Equal treatment of
religion does not require identical, but adequate and proportional
rights for all religions. Freedom of religion requires more than the
mere idea of a free marketplace of religions. It requires room for
actively living one’s religion in all its aspects, with religion being
positively integrated in law and society.
Securing human rights requires more than the monitoring of
other countries—it requires an understanding of different cultures.
Monitoring, indeed, is necessary, as it identifies specific problem
areas. There are certainly problems in Germany—indeed, how else
could it be in a community of 82 million people? A fair evaluation
requires a vision of the whole picture. Any concern about specific
problems must be considered a concern about religious freedom in
general. Concern about home politics or about political or economic
influence abroad should not blur the screen. Religious freedom
flourishes best in legal and social structures, in atmospheres, in
longer-term implementation.
Religious freedom will grow, but only in community with
churches and other religious communities, and only with respect of
regional experience, traditions, and contemporary and future needs.
Protection of human rights is not a one-sided protection of mere
individual interests; it involves individuals and community, and must
balance often conflicting interests. This balance cannot be modeled
in abstracts, and there are no pre-formulated concepts that could
ever work. This balance to be brought about requires knowledge of
the specific traits of the people concerned, of their aims and needs, of
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their historical experiences and emotions, of their values and fears,
and it will only succeed with openness to new developments.
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